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On the Coefficient of Variation as a Measure of Risk Sensitivity* 
 
 
 
James C. Cox and Vjollca Sadiraj 
 
Department of Economics and Experimental Economics Center 
Georgia State University 
 
 
 
Weber, Shafir, and Blais (2004) advocate use of the coefficient of variation (CV) as a 
measure of risk sensitivity and apply CV in a meta-analysis of data for risky choices 
by humans and animals. We critically re-examine the CV measure as either a 
normative or descriptive criterion for decision under risk. CV fails as a normative 
criterion because it violates first order stochastic dominance. Whether or not CV 
succeeds as a descriptive criterion depends on its consistency or inconsistency with 
data from experiments designed to test its distinctive properties. We report an 
experiment with human subjects motivated by salient monetary payoffs. The data are 
inconsistent with the hypothesis that the CVs of risky lotteries are a significant 
determinant of subjects’ choices between the lotteries and certain payoffs.  
 
 
 
Weber, Shafir, and Blais (2004) report a meta analysis of data for human and animal decision 
making under risk that uses the coefficient of variation (CV) as a measure of risk sensitivity. 
They argue that the coefficient of variation (CV), defined as the ratio of standard deviation (SD) 
to expected value (EV), is a good predictor of animal and human “risk sensitivity.”  Weber, et al. 
(2004, pgs. 432 – 434) review results from the analysis of animal data in Shafir (2000) in which 
the proportion of animals choosing certain (sure thing) rewards rather than risky rewards is 
regressed on the CV of risky rewards. For comparison, Weber, et al. (pg. 434) report results from 
another regression in which the proportion of sure thing choices is regressed on the EV of risky 
rewards. They conclude that: “…neither SD nor EV predicts risk sensitivity in isolation. Their 
ratio, however, in the form of the CV does so very well.”   
Weber, et al. (eq. 1, p. 433) write the utility of an option with random return X as a 
linear function of the utility of its expected value, (EV( ))u X  and its risk R ( )X . They note that, 
for a quadratic utility function, the measure of risk is the variance, Var ( )X . They argue for use 
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of the dimension-invariant CV ( )X , instead of Var ( )X  or SD ( )X , in predicting risk sensitivity 
in humans and lower animals.   
We critically re-examine the Weber, et al. CV measure of risk sensitivity. We ask 
whether CV can provide either a credible normative criterion for decision under risk or a 
descriptive criterion of decision making in risky environments. 
The CV measure only provides a measure of risk sensitivity that is distinct from SD when 
it is applied to risks with distinct EVs. If application of CV were to be restricted to comparisons 
across choice alternatives with the same EV then it would produce a measure that was identical to 
SD except for an irrelevant scale factor. Thus we consider using CV as a measure of riskiness 
across gambles with distinct EVs.  Consider two risky choice options with random returns, X  
and .Y  If for individual ,j  (EV( )) CV( ) (EV( )) CV( )j j j ju X b X u Y b Y− < − ,  then option Y  
is preferred to option X  by individual j according to the CV measure of risk sensitivity (Weber, 
et al., pgs. 433, 443). 
We analyze CV as a criterion for decision under risk. We first ask whether choosing 
among risky alternatives according to their ordering by CV would promote the self-interest of the 
decision maker. In other words, we ask whether CV provides a (credible) normative criterion for 
decision under risk that is consistent with monotonicity of preferences, as in the criterion of first-
order stochastic dominance (Hadar and Russell, 1969; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970). 
Subsequently, we report an experiment, with financially motivated human decision makers, 
designed to provide a direct test for consistency of subjects’ decisions under risk with use of CV 
as a decision criterion.  
 
 
Can the CV Measure Provide a Normative Criterion for Decision under Risk? 
 
We here ask whether the CV measure of risk sensitivity can provide a credible normative 
criterion for decision under risk.  We show that the CV measure cannot provide a credible 
normative criterion for choosing between non-degenerate lotteries because it is inconsistent with 
first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD).1 Consistency with FOSD is the most basic requirement 
for rational choice over risky alternatives because it follows from positive monotonicity of the 
agent’s objective function in the reward medium.  An animal that “prefers” to increase its fitness 
should make risky foraging choices that are consistent with FOSD.2  A human who prefers more 
money to less should make financial choices that are consistent with FOSD.3 
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Let an individual’s preferences over lotteries that involve gains be characterized by some 
0b > and some positively monotonic function ( )u ⋅ over outcomes. Let positive numbers , ,k?  and 
2n > be given. Let nL denote the binary lottery that yields payoff of p/?  with probability p  
and payoff of )1/( pn −?  with probability p−1 .  Similarly, let n kL +   denote the binary lottery 
that yields payoff of p/?  with probability p  and payoff of ( ) / (1 )n k p+ −?  with 
probability p−1 . We show that there exists [0.5,1)p∈ such that the individual prefers binary 
lottery nL  to lottery n kL +  according to the CV criterion.  Note that the only difference between 
lotteries nL  and n kL +  is that the high outcome in n kL +  is / (1 )k p−?  larger than the high 
outcome in nL .  Yet lottery nL  is preferred to n kL +   according to CV model.   
To show the result start by noting that the CV of lottery nL  is given by 
 (1) 
( )2 2 2
2 2
1/ 1/ / (1 ) 1
( 1) (1 )
p np n pCV
n p p
− ++ −= − =+ −
? ?
? .  
It can be easily checked that for 1/ ( 1)p n> + (which follows from [0.5,1)p∈ , and 2n > ), the 
CV of gambles nL   is increasing in n . According to the CV measure of risk sensitivity (Weber, 
et al., pgs. 433, 443), option  nL  is preferred to option n kL + if 
 (2)  ( ) ( )
n n n k n kL L L L
u EV bCV u EV bCV+ +− > − .  
Substituting expressions for EV and CV yields 
(3) 
( )
n nL  L  
1/ 1
( ) -  (( 1) )
(1 )
p n
u EV bCV u n b
p p
− += + − −? . 
and  
(4) 
( )
n+k n+kL  L  
1/ 1
( )-  (( 1 ) )
(1 )
p n k
u EV bCV u n k b
p p
− + += + + − −?  
Therefore, in statement (2), we get that nL  is preferred to option n kL +  if: 
(5) 
0 (( 1) ) (( 1 ) )
1 1
1 1(1 )
n n kL L
u n u n k b CV CV
bu
n k np p
+
⎡ ⎤< + − + + − −⎣ ⎦
⎛ ⎞= −Δ − −⎜ ⎟+ + +− ⎝ ⎠
? ?
 
Hence, statement (2) is equivalent to   
(6) ( ) (1 )( 1) 1
bk p p
n n k u
> −+ + + Δ  
 4
For any given n, k, u( ⋅ ), and b, the left hand side of the last inequality is a finite number, say C. 
The right-hand side has limit 0 for p close to 1, so, we can always find a p such that (1 )p p−  is 
less than C. Therefore, nL  is preferred to option n kL + for some p. This is inconsistent with 
positive monotonicity of preferences. 
As an example, for any given 0, 1, 2b n> = =?  and 1k = normalize ( )u ⋅ such that 
(4) (3) 2 / ( 1)( 1) / 6u u bk n n k b− = + + + = . Take 1 / 2p = .  Then, statement (6) is satisfied. 
Consider option A, a binary lottery that pays 2 with probability 1/2 and 4 with probability 1/2.  
Let option B be the binary lottery with 1/2 probabilities of payoffs of 2 and 6. It is easiest to think 
of these numbers as referring to amounts of money but that interpretation is not necessary for our 
argument; the payoffs could, instead, be based on a measure of foraging yield. If the payoffs are 
amounts of money then whether they are numbers of dollars or millions of dollars or some other 
unit of account is irrelevant to the argument. Note that 3, 4, 1 / 3,A B AEV EV CV= = = and 
1 / 2.BCV =  According to the CV measure of risk sensitivity (Weber, et al., pgs. 433, 443): 
(7) ( ) ( )A BU X U X− = (3) /3  (4) / 2u b u b− − + . 
Note that ( ) ( ) 0A BU X U X− >  for 6[ (4) (3)];b u u> −  so, in that case, the agent prefers option 
A to option B. But this conclusion is inconsistent with the self-interest of any agent who is not 
satiated in the reward medium because the only difference between the two gambles is that the 
high payoff equals 4 in option A and 6 in option B.   
This demonstrates that CV cannot provide a credible normative criterion for decision 
under risk because, by violating first-order stochastic dominance, it would require in some 
contexts that animals make choices that are inconsistent with increasing fitness and humans make 
choices that are inconsistent with preferring more money to less. 
 
 
Can the CV Measure Provide a Descriptive Model for Decision under Risk? 
 
Although the CV measure of risk sensitivity is inconsistent with fitness-maximizing and wealth-
maximizing decision making under risk, perhaps it is nevertheless consistent with how agents 
actually make decisions. Weber, et al. estimate parameters that fit SD and CV measures to data 
from many experiments and conclude that CV fits the data better. We ask a different question 
than parameter fitting. We design an experiment on choice under risk that provides a direct test 
for the effects of CV on subjects’ willingness to take risks.  
Experimental Design 
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The decision task is to choose between two options in each of six decision pages. One of the six 
decision pages of each subject is randomly chosen for money payoff by rolling a die in the 
presence of the subject. On each decision page, a subject is asked to circle A, B, or I, thereby 
indicating a choice of option A or option B or indifference. Subjects are told that if they circle I 
then the experimenter will choose option A or option B for them. Subject instructions and 
decision pages (or response forms) are included in the appendix. The decision pages are given to 
each subject in an independently drawn random order. Subjects have access to all six decision 
pages while making each decision.  
 Table 1 reports the six decision tasks in the experiment. In Task 1, for example, a subject 
is asked to choose between $7 for sure and the binary lottery that pays $2.50 if ball 1 is drawn 
from the bingo cage or pays $7.50 if ball 2, 3,…,9, or 10 is drawn. Table 1 reports the EV and CV 
of option B in each of decision Tasks 1 – 6.  Note that the EV of option B in each task equals the 
sure payoff in option A of that task. The CV measure increases monotonically with decision task 
number, from a low of 0.21 for Task 1 to a high of 2.50 for Task 6. Therefore, if the CV measure 
is consistent with subjects’ decision making under risk then their frequency of choosing the sure 
amount of payoff will increase monotonically with the task number in Table 1 since we are in a 
gain domain (i.e. b > 0) and  
(8) ( ) ( )A B Bu A bCV u B bCV bCV− − + = . 
 
Data from the Experiment 
Fifty subjects participated in the experiment. Figure 1 shows graphs of the proportions of subjects 
who chose the safe option and the CVs of the lotteries in Tasks 1 – 6 in the experiment.  CV is 
monotonically increasing with task number. In contrast, the proportion of subjects who chose the 
sure thing shows no clear relationship to CV. The correlation coefficient is 0.143 according to the 
Spearman rank correlation test. This test reports a p-value of 0.787, so the null hypothesis that 
proportions of choices of the sure thing and CVs of the risky lotteries are independent is not 
rejected. 
  The Spearman test and the graphs in Figure 1 use aggregate data. Perhaps the effects of 
subject heterogeneity mask the effects of CV on individuals’ willingness to take risks. The Model 
I Probit column of Table 2 reports results from a random effects probit analysis of the data in 
which observations for each individual subject comprise a “group” of observations.4 The 
explanatory variables are CV of the risky lotteries and 15 measures of subjects’ individual 
characteristics. These 15 measures are provided by subjects’ responses on the questionnaire 
included in the appendix. The p-value for the chi-square test of significance of the “regression” is 
0.024. The coefficients of two of the explanatory variables are significant at 1% while four more 
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are significant at 10%. The p-value of the coefficient for CV is 0.141; hence the coefficient is 
insignificantly different from 0. 
The Model II Probit column of Table 2 reports a probit analysis that includes all of the 
variables in Model I plus the EV of the lotteries. The coefficients for EV and CV are 
insignificant.  Coefficients for two subject characteristics are significant at 1% while three others 
are significant at 10%. Significance tests for Probit coefficients are based on normally distributed 
errors.  
The Model I Logit and Model II Logit columns of Table 2 report logit analyses with 
significance tests based on errors with logistic distribution. The coefficients on CV in both 
models, and the coefficient on EV in Model 2, are all insignificant. Significance of coefficients on 
other variables are similar to that for the probit analysis.  
The Spearman test, probit analysis, and logit analysis all support the same conclusion: the 
CV of risky lotteries does not have a significant effect on decisions by subjects in our experiment. 
We conclude that the CV measure of risk sensitivity does not provide either a credible normative 
criterion for decision under risk or a descriptive model consistent with subjects’ actual decision 
making in the risky environment of our experiment.  
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 Endnotes 
 
* We wish to thank Jerome R. Busemeyer for helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier 
version.  
1.  Let F  and G  be two cumulative probability distributions of payoffs defined on the set Ω .  
Strict first order stochastic dominance of F  over G  is defined by:  
(i) )()( xGxF ≤ , for all Ω∈x ; and (ii) )()( kk xGxF < , for at least one Ω∈kx . 
2. Such “preference” can refer either to a deterministic ordering or a probabilistic ordering in 
which a violation of FOSD occurs when an agent chooses the dominated (risky-choice) 
alternative more than 50% of the time. 
3. In contrast, it is second-order stochastic dominance that provides a well-defined nonparametric 
measure of riskiness (Hadar and Russell, 1969; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970). For example, the 
cumulative probability distribution of payoffs G  is “more risky than” the distribution F  if G  is 
a mean-preserving spread of F .  
4. Software for probit and logit analysis does not use the seven observations in which subjects 
chose indifference rather than strict preference for option A or option B (coded as 0 and 1). Hence 
the parameter estimates are based on 293 observations. 
  
 
 
References 
 
Hadar, J. & Rusell, W.R. (1969). Rules for ordering uncertain prospects. American Economic 
Review, 59, 25-34. 
 
Rothschild, M. & Stiglitz, J.E. (1970). Increasing risk: I. A definition. Journal of Economic 
Theory, 2, 225-243. 
 
Shafir, S. (2000).  Risk-sensitive foraging: The effect of relative variability. Oikos, 88, 663-669. 
 
Weber, E. U., Shafir, S., & Blais, A. (2004). Predicting risk sensitivity in humans and lower 
animals: Risk as variance or coefficient of variation. Psychological Review, 111, 430-445. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The observed frequencies of the sure option and values of CV across tasks 
 
 
Table 1.  Options A and B in Decision Tasks 1 – 6 
 
Task  Option A Option B 
 
  Low Payoff $ Low Payoff Balls High Payoff  $ High Payoff Balls EV CV 
Task 1 $7 $2.50 1 $7.50 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 $7 0.21 
Task 2 $27 $2.50  1,2,3 $37.50 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 $27 0.59 
Task 3 $35 $2.50  1, 2, 3, 4, 5 $67.50 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 $35 0.92 
Task 4 $31 $2.50  1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 $97.50 8, 9, 10 $31 1.40 
Task 5 $22 $2.50  1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 $100.00 9, 10 $22 1.77 
Task 6 $15 $2.50  1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 $127.50 10 $15 2.50 
 
 
Table 2.  Probit and Logit Analyses of the Data 
 Model I Probit Model II Probit Model I Logit Model II Logit 
CV 
0.160 
(0.141) 
0.156 
(0.151) 
0.250 
(0.176) 
0.245 
(0.180) 
EV  
0.006 
(0.496) 
 
0.010 
(0.520) 
Study year 
0.113 
(0.391) 
0.110 
(0.401) 
0.183 
(0.412) 
0.181 
(0.418) 
Major category 
0.061 
(0.480) 
0.061 
(0.481) 
0.108 
(0.469) 
0.108 
(0.472) 
age 
-0.117*** 
(0.008) 
-0.117*** 
(0.007) 
-0.196*** 
(0.008) 
-0.196*** 
(0.008) 
gender 
-0.555* 
(0.086) 
-0.551* 
(0.089) 
-0.912* 
(0.097) 
-0.909* 
(0.099) 
height 
0.061* 
(0.097) 
0.061 
(0.101) 
0.098 
(0.120) 
0.098 
(0.122) 
race 
0.182 
(0.110) 
0.184 
(0.106) 
0.298 
(0.123) 
0.300 
(0.120) 
Smoking 
0.384 
(0.349) 
0.382 
(0.352) 
0.663 
(0.335) 
0.660 
(0.337) 
Child nr 
0.003 
(0.983) 
0.002 
(0.987) 
0.004 
(0.985) 
0.003 
(0.987) 
Seek Opportunity 
-0.296*** 
(0.001) 
-0.295*** 
(0.001) 
-0.488*** 
(0.002) 
-0.488*** 
(0.002) 
Consequences 
Free 
0.060 
(0.341) 
0.059 
(0.350) 
0.103 
(0.336) 
0.103 
(0.340) 
Lucky Breaks 
0.040 
(0.328) 
0.040 
(0.326) 
0.067 
(0.323) 
0.067 
(0.322) 
Get Jittery 
0.135* 
(0.015) 
0.136* 
(0.015) 
0.223** 
(0.019) 
0.223** 
(0.018) 
Carefully  
Proceed 
-0.043 
(0.671) 
0.041 
(0.682) 
-0.060 
(0.719) 
-0.059 
(0.725) 
Assess Risk 
0.171* 
(0.051) 
0.170* 
(0.053) 
0.273* 
(0.065) 
0.271* 
(0.066) 
Danger Worry 
free 
0.057 
(0.352) 
0.058 
(0.346) 
0.096 
(0.356) 
0.096 
(0.353) 
Constant 
-2.130 
(0.456) 
-2.217 
(0.439) 
-3.264 
(0.501) 
-3.429 
(0.480) 
Log-likelihood -160.446 -160.214 -160.881 -160.674 
Wald Chi-square 
28.98** 
(0.024) 
29.42** 
(0.031) 
26.08* 
(0.053) 
26.39* 
(0.068) 
Nr of observations 293 293 293 293 
 p-values are reported in parentheses; *p-value < 0.1; **p-value < 0.05; ***p-value < 0.01 
Appendix: Subject Instructions, Decision Pages, and Questionnaire 
 
Subject Instructions 
You will be paid an amount determined by your decisions in this experiment and the outcomes 
from rolling a die and drawing a numbered ball from a bingo cage. 
  
The experiment proceeds as follows.  First, you choose your preferred option in each of six 
tables. Second, which of the six tables will be selected for money payoff will be determined by 
rolling a six-sided die in your presence. The number that ends “up” on the die determines which 
one of your decision tables pays money. 
 
Note that only one of your six decisions will be selected for money payoff by rolling the die; thus 
you should decide which option you prefer in each table independently of your choice in other 
tables.   
 
You are asked to choose either option A or option B in each of six tables.  
 
The example below shows the type of choice table that will be included in the experiment.  
 
In Table 1, if you choose Option A, then your payoff is $54 (if this table is selected by rolling the 
die).   
 
If you choose Option B (and this table is selected by rolling the die) then your payoff is 
determined by drawing a ball from a bingo cage that contains 10 balls with 10 different numbers. 
Your payoff from choosing Option B is: 
$5 if the bingo cage selects ball 1, 2, or 3; 
$75 if the bingo cage selects ball 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10.  
 
You indicate your choice in the third column. If you prefer Option A to Option B then circle A. If 
you prefer Option B to Option A then circle B. In case you are indifferent between the two 
options, you circle I.  If I is circled then the experimenter will choose Option A or Option B for 
you.  
 
 
Table 1 
 
Option A 
  
Option B 
 
My Choice 
 
               $54 
$5 if ball from {1, 2, 3} 
or  
$75 if ball from {4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10} 
 
A    B    I 
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Decision Pages 
 
The response forms used in the experiment consist of six decision pages. Each decision page 
contains one of the following tables, summary instructions for the choice task in the table, and 
explanation of the lotteries on that page. Full text of the decision pages is available upon request 
to the authors. The decision pages were given to individual subjects in independently drawn 
random order. Subjects had access to all six decision pages while making their decisions on every 
page. One decision page for each subject was independently, randomly selected for money 
payoff. 
 
Table Q 
 
Option A 
  
Option B 
 
My Choice 
 
                  $7 
$2.50 if ball from  {1} 
or  
$7.50 if ball from {2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10} 
 
A    B    I 
 
Table S 
 
Option A 
  
Option B 
 
My Choice 
 
                  $27 
$2.50 if ball from {1, 2, 3} 
or  
$37.50 if ball from {4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10} 
 
A    B    I 
 
Table U 
 
Option A 
  
Option B 
 
My Choice 
 
                 $35 
$2.50 if ball from {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} 
or  
$67.50 if ball from { 6, 7, 8, 9, 10} 
 
A    B    I 
 
Table W 
 
Option A 
  
Option B 
 
My Choice 
                  $31 
$2.50 if ball from { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 } 
or  
  $97.50 if ball from { 8, 9, 10 } 
A    B    I 
 
Table R 
 
Option A 
  
Option B 
 
My Choice 
                  $22 
$2.50 if ball from { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,8 } 
or  
  $100.00 if ball from { 9, 10 } 
A    B    I 
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Table T 
 
Option A 
  
Option B 
 
My Choice 
               
              $15 
 
$2.50 if ball from { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} 
or  
  $127.50 if ball from { 10 } 
A    B    I 
 
 
 
Questionnaire (with anonymous, coded responses) 
 
Thank you very much for participating in our decision experiment.  We would like to ask you a 
few questions.  Your privacy is protected because your name will not appear on this questionnaire 
or on your decision tables.  
 
 
Information about you: 
 
1. What year are you in school?  Freshman ____ Sophomore ____   Junior ____ Senior 
____ Grad. ____ 
 
2. What is your intended or declared  major ?      ___________________________ 
 
3. What is your age?  ______       
 
4. What is your gender?    Female ____       Male _____ 
 
5. What is your race?   Asian _____    Black/African American _____   White 
_____   Other ____ 
 
    Prefer not to respond _____ 
 
6. What is your height?    Feet  ____   Inches  ____ 
 
7. Are you a smoker?   Yes    ____   No   ____ 
 
8. What is your birth order?  Oldest child in your family?  ____ Youngest child?  ____  
Middle child?  ____ 
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General Questions: Please answer the following questions on a scale of 1-10, where 1 is 
Strongly Disagree  and 10 is Strongly Agree.  Please circle the number that represents your 
best answer. 
 
1. I seek opportunities for doing things that I never did before. 
 
1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10 
 
Strongly disagree     Strongly agree 
 
2. I don’t worry about the consequences of what I do. 
 
1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10 
 
Strongly disagree     Strongly agree 
 
3. I never get lucky breaks. 
 
1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10 
 
Strongly disagree     Strongly agree 
 
4. I frequently get jittery and worry about things. 
 
1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10 
 
Strongly disagree     Strongly agree 
 
5. I proceed with care in most endeavors. 
 
1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10 
 
Strongly disagree     Strongly agree 
 
6. I always assess the prospects and risks before starting a new activity. 
 
1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10 
 
Strongly disagree     Strongly agree 
 
7. I tend to do dangerous things without adequate precautions. 
 
1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10 
 
Strongly disagree     Strongly agree 
